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I
INTRODUCTION
The idea that an appeal to the second level of a court system should wait until
a final decision has issued at the first level of the system is as sweet and simple as a
baby's kiss. But as so often happens with legal affairs that are simple in theory the
finality requirement in actual operation becomes "dazzling in its complexity," as
Edward Cooper aptly says.' This is because in practice the finality-appealability
idea gets entangled in a thicket 2 of conflicting values. Finding a path through the
thicket is hard work, as those who have made the effort will attest. A great many
courses present themselves as possible solutions, but on analysis none appears to be
very satisfactory.
Like the basic premise of the finality requirement, the aims of finality com-
mand wide support. Most observers agree that cases should not go up to the
appellate courts in fragments, should not go up prematurely, and should not go up
repetitively. These undesirable procedural spasms can be avoided if appeals are
limited to judgments and orders that determine an action on the merits and leave
nothing to be done except enforcement. Insisting on that limitation is said to
respond directly to important "considerations of judicial economy and concern for
the prompt and efficient resolution of disputes . . .3
There is an obvious paradox in trying to promote promptness in disposing of
cases by delaying appeals until the end of the process instead of encouraging early
appellate review. In response, supporters of the finality principle maintain that no
matter how salutary early appeal seems in theory, the actual long term effect of
allowing an appeal to interrupt the progress of a lawsuit which is moving toward
disposition on the merits in the trial court is to produce more delay, not less. Prob-
ably the pro-finality side is partly right and partly wrong. Sometimes early review
is only a time-wasting interruption; but sometimes it does bring the case to a quick,
efficient termination. The problem calls for an entirely pragmatic solution-to
devise procedures or tests to identify the orders that should be reviewed promptly,
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without the end-of-the-road finality that comes when the trial court process has
run its complete course. That is easily said, but there are many questions: Should
the solution take the form of legislative prescriptions or judicial standards? Should
the procedures and tests determine the appealability of categories of cases on a
wholesale basis or provide for ad hoc, case-by-case determinations? Should the
criteria for appealability be stated explicitly or left to the "discretion" of the
judges? To these and related questions a great variety of answers and combina-
tions of answers can be devised. Examples of diverse appealability standards
drawn from several states and foreign countries, the proposals of Professor Cooper
and Dean Carrington, and the Interlocutory Restatement itself make clear how
many approaches are possible. In this article I shall comment particularly on the
Cooper and Carrington ideas in order to focus on the problem in its federal
context.
II
THE EXISTING FEDERAL SITUATION
The existing federal finality-appealability situation is an unacceptable morass.
The problem is not merely that the law of appealability is a hodgepodge, a kind of
crazy quilt of legislation and judicial decisions. Crazy quilts can be useful and
there are occasions when inelegance in the legal system works, but this is definitely
not one of those occasions. Entirely too much of the appellate courts' energy is
absorbed in deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and its
exceptions to hear cases brought before them-and in explaining why or why not.
These explanations add to the complexity of the problem, but do nothing to dispel
the confusion.
Many unkind remarks have been made about the maze of intricately uncon-
nected legislative and judicial prescriptions governing federal appealability today.
One of the most blameworthy features of the legislation appears in the first sen-
tence of the finality requirement, section 1291 of the Judicial Code.4 It causes
difficulties from that point on. Section 1291 declares: "The courts of appeals...
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of the district courts ... "
By negative implication, there is no "jurisdiction" in the court of appeals if the
decision is not final. Why make finality a predicate for jurisdiction? Presumably
doing so underlines the fact that Congress intends the finality requirement to be a
serious and unyielding prerequisite and one that not even the appellate courts
themselves may set aside. The apparent analogy is to subject matter competence
based upon diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy. The analogy is mis-
conceived. Diversity of citizenship is properly and necessarily prerequisite to fed-
eral court jurisdiction in non-federal-question cases because article 3 of the United
States Constitution so provides. Amount-in-controversy restrictions on the compe-
tence of major courts are sensible legislative means of protecting those courts from
inundation by small-claims suits. An important point about both the diversity
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). All statutory sections subsequently discussed also are contained in the
Judicial Code, Title 28 of the United States Code.
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and amount requirements is that they condition the courts' competence to hear the
action on attributes of the case itself, not on incidental procedural circumstances
such as whether more remains to be done before the action is at an end. Making
the power of the appellate courts to proceed depend on finality causes the courts to
try to satisfy the requirement by inventing artificial forms of finality. These
strained interpretations, resulting in quasi-finality, are major contributors to the
morass. Any worthwhile reform of the federal finality-appealability rules should
eliminate the "jurisdiction" language of section 1291. Jurisdiction terminology
should also be dropped from the other sections governing appealability, including
the time-for-appeal provisions of section 1297.
After laying down the basic requirement of finality, the Code enumerates
exceptions and methods of appealing without satisfying the finality provision. Sec-
tion 1292(a), entitled "Interlocutory Decisions," creates a group of per se excep-
tions mostly identified categorically in terms of the nature of the action involved.
The courts of appeals are given jurisdiction of interlocutory orders in four situ-
ations. Appellate review is in each a matter of right, without regard to the need
for immediate appeal in the particular case. Under section 1292(a)(1) the appel-
late courts are authorized to review interlocutory orders granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions. The rationale is that such orders may bring about a "serious, perhaps
irreparable consequence. ' '5 A large body of case law has grown up around the
issue of the appealability of orders staying proceedings. In some circuits, but not
in others, orders granting or denying stays of arbitration are appealable as
injunctions.
Interlocutory orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships
or to take certain steps in such proceedings are appealable under section
1292(a)(2). The purpose of the exception is similar to that for injunction orders-
forestalling irreparable damage. However, futility rather than irreparability is the
danger sought to be avoided in section 1292(a)(3) which provides for appeals from
interlocutory "decrees" determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admi-
ralty cases in whch appeals from final decrees are permitted. This allows appeals
after determination of liability but before a determination of damages to avoid the
expense and delay of computing damages in cases in which it turns out the libelant
has no right to recover. Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement that are
final except for accounting are appealable under section 1292(a)(4), again on the
basis that the expense and delay of computing damages can be avoided if the
interlocutory appeal results in denying recovery.
In addition to the legislatively defined categories of appealable nonfinal orders,
there are two amorphous, undefined categories. One arises from the "mandamus"
exception to the finality principle under section 1651(a), which provides: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . ." The man-
damus route of appeal under the All-Writs provision has been a widening tear in
5. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
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the fabric of the final-decision limit on appeals. It has become an ordinary rather
than an extraordinary route of appeal.
The second amorphous category is created by the provision of Rule 54(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing appeal of orders disposing of less
than all claims or parties in a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims,
provided the district court certifies there is no just cause for delay of the appeal.
One of the most confused and troublesome clusters of problems in this field
results from the creation by the courts of the category of what are here called
"quasi-final" orders. These result from judicial construction of the provisions of
the final-decision statute, section 1291. Although ordinarily a final decision under
that section is considered to be a judgment or order that determines the litigation
on the merits and leaves nothing to be done except enforcement, the Supreme
Court has recognized several types of orders as appealable even though they do not
pass that test of finality. The collateral order doctrine, which emerged in Cohen v.
Benefic'al Industrial Loan Corp.,6 laid down the requirements for an order to qualify
for review. The "death-knell" doctrine, related to the collateral order doctrine in
its rationale, is that immediate appeal should be available from a district court
order that, although not strictly final, makes meaningful continuation of the suit
legally or practically impossible.
In addition to the legislatively defined and the judicially created categories of
cases and decisions that are per se appealable even though not final in fact, Con-
gress has provided in section 1292(b) a means of reviewing on an ad hoc basis an
interlocutory order in a civil case if the trial court makes an appropriate certifica-
tion and the appellate court accepts the case. This certification procedure permits
selective avoidance of the finality requirement on a case-by-case basis. It suppos-
edly allows dealing in a flexible way with "occasions which defy precise delinea-
tion or description in which as a practical matter orderly administration is
frustrated by the necessity of a waste of precious judicial time while the case grinds
through to a final judgment as the sole medium through which to test the correct-
ness of some isolated identifiable point of fact, of law, of substance or procedure,
upon which in a realistic way the whole case or defense will turn."7
III
PROFESSOR COOPER'S PROPOSALS
The foregoing helter-skelter procedures, circumstances and decisions have pro-
duced a near-chaotic state of affairs that need prompt attention. Professor Cooper
proposes to remedy the situation by enlarging the present scope of the district
court's power to certify interlocutory appeals, with discretion in the court of
appeals to accept or reject the certification. During a transitional period, in which
the present doctrines might wither away, there would be two sets of procedures for
appealing interlocutory orders, one based on legislatively and judicially declared
criteria, the other based on discretion. Eventually the criteria might be discarded,
6. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
7. Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1961).
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leaving a system in which discretionary appeals are the only supplement to appeals
from genuinely final judgments.
Professor Cooper's analysis of the present jumbled state of the law and his call
for simplification are sound and convincing. He is clearly right to urge a simpler
way to determine appealability. "It is very tempting," he states, "to replace the
rules with a flexible system that relies largely on discretion to determine the occa-
sions for appeal before a truly final judgment." He succumbs to the temptation.
In my view his prescription for a cure is not as sound as his diagnosis of the
problem and the need. Of the many helpful insights he offers, two warrant special
note. First, he shows that the urgency of allowing an interlocutory appeal may
differ markedly from one area of the law to another because of such factors as the
higher likelihood of error and the greater severity of injury from delay in cor-
recting the error by appeal. The same is true of some types of procedural rulings,
he notes. His analysis goes far beyond the kind of reasoning that identified the
problem areas in which section 1292(a) permits interlocutory appeals. Professor
Cooper's analytical approach has an important potential in reforming appeala-
bility procedures and should be utilized to identify appropriate exceptions to the
finality requirements.
Another important insight of the Cooper article is its careful demonstration
that a solution to the appealability problem depends not only on developing
improved methods of identifying appeal-worthy nonfinal orders, but upon the
quality of the judges and the character of the bar. He advances an intriguing
theory concerning the interactive effects of the quality of the trial judges, appeala-
bility, and scope of review. In recognizing that the key to procedural reform of
this kind depends on improvements in personnel and their motivations, as well as
on workable standards and methods of decision, Professor Cooper has given a
helpful boost to an evolving realism in procedural reform. 9 However, his specific
plan of reform is not a promising one.
Whatever else, the Cooper formula for clearing up the finality-appealability
mess is straightforward: (1) simplify present procedures for interlocutory appeal
via the district court certification route and combine them with extraordinary writ
practice; (2) remove present limitations on the district court's power to certify
interlocutory appeals; (3) require the would-be appellant to apply to the district
court unless a strong showing is made justifying direct application to the court of
appeals; and (4) make the allowance of an interlocutory appeal entirely discre-
tionary with' the court of appeals. The fourth element-the appellate court's exer-
cise of discretion to allow or disallow the interlocutory appeal-is obviously the
keystone of Professor Cooper's structure. That is the chief difficulty with it.
Investing the courts of appeals with the power of standardless choice to hear or
reject interlocutory appeals will not do much to remedy the main evils of the
present situation. Unlike Professor Cooper, I do not see the transformation of rules
into discretion as a positive or promising movement in this context.
8. Cooper, supra note 1, at 157.
9. See Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules Afier Half A Ceniury, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984).
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An apparent analog for his plan to allow the reviewing court discretion as to
which appeals it will hear is the procedure used by the Supreme Court of the
United States and many of the highest courts in the states in granting or denying
permission to appeal. Despite surface similarity, there is a great difference
between the objectives and functioning of certiorari or other leave-to-appeal proce-
dures and the proposed practice. In the former, the case has ordinarily had the
benefit of review by one appellate court to assure the correctness of the proceeding
and the decision. The question usually underlying the choice confronting the
highest court is whether an "institutional review" should be afforded for law-
declaring reasons going beyond the case itself-for example, because the issue is
novel, or one of great public interest, or one on which the lower appellate court
decisions are in conflict.' 0 Those standards provide a fair amount of guidance for
lawyers who frame petitions for review by the highest courts and for the judges of
those courts when they make their choices. In contrast, the prime function of a
hearing by the federal courts of appeals is not institutional review but monitoring
the trial level decision for correctness in the normal way of an intermediate appel-
late court. The review-for-correctness function implicitly requires that if the court
can choose which cases to review it should do so on the basis of magnitude of error,
severity of injury, and similar criteria. These features are usually specific to the
case and highly resistant to generalizing. What is more, they call for subtle and
subjective judgments that are difficult to reach. It is hard to see how exposing the
courts of appeals to applications for interlocutory review based on the open-ended
criteria mentioned will serve any of the interests we seek to further.
While Professor Cooper is right in saying that better judges and wiser lawyers
will contribute to solving the finality-appealability puzzle, I doubt that he is fore-
casting accurately in suggesting that "with a very wise and well accultured appel-
late bar, rules of discretion might satisfy all needs for interlocutory review."''
Decades of experience with the similar grant of discretion in section 1292(b) have
not produced evidence to support such optimism. 12 Judicial discretion remains
today one of the most intricate and mysterious of the concepts judges and lawyers
regularly encounter.' 3 It would be a mistake to make it the keystone of a rede-
signed finality-appealability structure.
Presumably, the reason the present certification-discretion procedure is not
used more frequently is the inhibitory effect of the triad of limitations on district
court certifications mandated by section 1292(b). With those removed by the
Cooper revisions, there is every prospect that large numbers of interlocutory
appeals will seek certification. Assume that a conscientious district judge then con-
sults the tangled entrails of the finality-appealability doctrines that the caselaw
10. R. MACCRATE, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 69-71 (1982)
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(including the extraordinary writs decisions) has produced and that the certifica:
tion is granted. The appellate court, with high volumes of appeals of right
pressing on it, now has to decide whether to add to its burden by accepting the
certified interlocutory appeal as a matter of grace. This often is not merely a deci-
sion on the "timing" of the appeal-whether to hear it now or later-but on
whether there is to be any review of the order being challenged. If an appeal on
that question is not heard now, one may never materialize, either because the
would-be appellant wins at trial or because the issue prompting the present appeal
becomes moot. But whatever the future may hold in store for the case, one thing is
clear: the appellate court will have to spend time and energy today deciding
whether to accept the appeal, certified or not. This follows from an axiom Paul
Carrington has been know to utter, namely: "I can't think about whether I ought
to think about a question without thinking about it." Added deliberative efforts of
that type, if they were to be encountered in many cases, could doom an all-discre-
tionary interlocutory appeal regime.
IV
DEAN CARRINGTON'S PROPOSALS
Dean Carrington appears to be in basic agreement with Professor Cooper
about what is wrong with the federal law of finality-appealability but he has a
very different idea about how to right it. What is wrong, in Carrington's view, is
the "unconscionable intricacy of the existing law," which depends on "overlapping
exceptions, each less lucid than the next." 14 These exceptions are understandable
efforts to prevent the injuries that strict adherence to the finality requirement
would inflict in some cases; however, the courts' practice of reaffirming the final-
decision dogma even as they circumvent it by exceptions is confusing. The Car-
rington plan is to correct this situation by rules, not discretion. Most of the rules
are contained in a draft statute he entitles "A Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act,"
which he conceives to be a "statutory machete" to trim away the overgrowth of
exceptions that hide what the courts are actually doing to resolve the finality-
appealability dilemma. The Act invites supplementation by the adoption of rules
made pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
In the respects relevant here the Carrington statute provides, first, that final
decisions are appealable if they are really final, with finality to depend not on
variable definitions but on a document signed by the district judge or magistrate
manifesting intent that the case be at an end. Under this standard "finality" will
meet even the stringent Yogi Berra test of ultimacy, namely: "It ain't over 'til it's
over."
Second, under the Act, interlocutory orders will be appealable if they (a) fall
into a specified category of actions or orders relating to injunctions, receivers or
patents; or (b) affect substantial rights that cannot be effectively protected on
review following a final decision; or (c) fall within the class of appealable orders
14. Carrington, supra note 2, at 166.
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designated by a rule adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act; or (d) comply
with the certification and related requirements contained in section 1292(b).
The next noteworthy feature of the Act is that it makes passing the appeala-
bility tests a sine qua non of "jurisdiction" of the courts of appeals. Thus, a new
section 1291(b) declares: "Appellate jurisdiction under this section shall not vest
until the final decision of the district court is set forth on a separate document"
and signed by the judge or magistrate. A similar effect is provided in section
1292(a) for nonfinal orders, this time by negative implication: "The courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the district
courts when essential to protect substantial rights . . . ." Then, in a departure
from present law, section 1298(a) of the Act makes a defect of appellate jurisdic-
tion waivable and provides that jurisdiction on appeal may be conferred by con-
sent of the parties. For reasons discussed above, I strongly favor the end result the
act would reach, but would achieve it by scrapping the idea that meeting the
appealability requirements is a "jurisdictional" necessity. The issues of appeala-
bility of a decision for finality or other characteristics (such as the decision's pecu-
liar impact upon a party's interests) and of the timeliness of an appeal ought not to
be treated as going to the power of an appellate court to act any more than the
untimeliness of starting an action, making a motion, or serving a responsive
pleading utterly divests the district court of power to deal with the case. All these
questions should be treated as procedural rules-very important rules, to be sure,
and subject to serious consequences if violated-but violation should be treated as
a procedural failure, not as competence-destroying. As Professor Cooper says, it is
important to avoid the "foolish forfeitures" that come from treating defects in
appealability as divesting the appellate court of "jurisdiction" over the case sub-
mitted to it. If the Carrington statute were revised to treat its subject matter as
involving serious requirements of procedure, appropriate provisions could be made
to deal with lapses and neither the erection nor the dismantling of jurisdictional
constructs would be necessary.
Apart from that reservation, I favor the basic approach and most of the essen-
tial provisions of the Act. Getting rid of the judicial game-playing that has pro-
duced quasi-finality in the form of collateral orders, death knells and similar
doctrines is very desirable. Those strained interpretations of finality have
stretched the concept out of shape. Clarity would result from limiting finality to its
end-of-the-case meaning. Another benefit of the Carrington proposal would be to
return the extraordinary writs practice to its proper place as a repository of appel-
late power to correct grave errors of egregious dimensions. It should not be what it
has become in some decisions-an all-purpose alternative method of appealing.
The key provision of the Act is obviously section 1291(a), allowing interlocu-
tory appeals when "essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be effec-
tively enforced on review after final decision." This is intended to embody the
existing practice regarding what I have called "quasi-finality." Its purpose is to
direct attention to the "real considerations" in resolving finality-appealability
issues and to reduce confusion. This would meet the main defect of the present
system-the courts' inability to protect substantial rights, usually procedural in
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nature-from erroneous rulings if they await final decision to attempt corrective
action. Whether the proposed statute will be effective in allowing those rulings to
be appealed soon enough without opening the appealability doors too widely
depends on whether "substantial rights" can accurately be recognized to an effec-
tive extent. North Carolina and New York have provisions making the quoted
term the pivotal one in determining interlocutory appealability. The experience
with the term in New York has not been encouraging and a recent study has urged
its abolition on the ground that it provides too loose a standard to be continued.' 5
The proposal to identify potential interlocutory appeals by rule of court is an
original approach that may well be the best of the available alternatives. It assures
that continuing experience with this stubborn problem can be converted into rule-
prescribed standards that will give both the courts and the bar a basis for knowing
which interlocutory orders are immediately appealable. The rulemaking process is
better suited to the careful monitoring effort needed here than the ponderous legis-
lative process.
V
CONCLUSION
The finality-appealability problem is not likely to be solved by a bold stroke in
the form of legislation, judicial decisions or scholarly inventions. More than likely,
we shall have the problem with us for a long time. However, the law on the sub-
ject is presently much more complicated, confused and conflicting than it needs to
be. A thorough revision is in order. The Interlocutory Restatement is a major
contribution to the process. So are the articles that have been assembled here.
Particularly helpful in their treatment of the federal aspects are the Cooper and
Carrington papers to which this comment is addressed.
15. R. MACCRATE, supra note 10, at 86-88; see also Whichard, Appealability in North Carolina: Common
Law Defmition of the Statutory "Substantil Rights" Doctrne, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 123,
125.
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